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Abstract: The paper reports simulations applied on two similar congestion games: the first is the 
classical minority game. The second one is a asymmetric variation of the minority game with linear 
payoff functions. For each game simulation results based on an extended reinforcement algorithm are 
compared with real experimental statistics. It is shown that the extension of the reinforcement model is 
essential for fitting the experimental data and estimating the players behaviour. 
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1  The Investigated Games  
1. 1.    Concestion Game I (CI) – The Minority Game 
 
The first discussed congestion game (CI) is a well known minority game. The set-up of the minority 
game introduced by W. Brian Arthur is the following: a number of players n have to choose in several 
periods whether to go to a place A or B. Those players who have chosen the less crowded place win, 
the others lose.  The number of players in each Simulation was 9, the number of periods was 100. The 
players get an payoff  A t  and  B t  depending on the numbers  A n  and  B n  of participants choosing A and 
B, respectively: 
B A B A n n t t < ⇔ = = 0 , 1  
B A A B n n t t > ⇔ = = 0 , 1 . 
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The period payoff was  A t  if A was chosen and  B t  if B was chosen. There are no pure 
equilibria in this game. The pareto-optimum can be reached by 4 players on one and 5 players 
on the other pace.  
 
1.2.   Assymetric Congestion Games (CII) 
 
The second congestion game (CII) is a variation of the minority game: the number of Agents 
in this game was 18, 36, 54, 72 and 90. The number of played periods was 100.  
 
The period payoff for the 18 player setting was 40 – t with t =  A t  if A was chosen and t =  S t  
if B was chosen, where  A t  and  B t  depends on the numbers  A n  and  B n  of participants 
choosing A and B, respectively:  A A n t 2 6+ =  and  B B n t 3 12+ = . 
All pure equilibria of the game are characterized by  A n = 12 and  B n = 6. The equilibrium 
payoff is 10 units per player and period. The pareto-optimum can be reached by  A n = 11 and 
B n = 7. 
 
The modified payoff functions for the experiments with 36, 54, 72 and 90 agents are 18λ , 
λ =2,…,5: 
[ ] A A n p 2 6 40 + λ − λ =  
[ ] B B n p 3 12 40 + λ − λ =  
 
Table 1 shows all pure equilibria in the CII depending on the number of players. 
Number of Players  Equilibrium 
 A  B 
18 12 6 
36 24 12 
54 36 18 
72 48 24 
90 60 30 
 
Table 1: Pure equilibria in CII depending on the number of participating agents. 
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CI and CII are frequently interpreted as traffic scenarios [Schreckenberg, Selten, Pitz, Chmua 
(2003)]. In case of CII place A and place B are understand as road with high (main road) and 
road with low (side road) capacity road and  A t  and  B t  as travel times  
 
 
1.2.   Experimental Set-up of CI  and CII 
 
Each of the games CI and CII with 9 and 18 persons were played 6 times with students at the 
Laboratory of Experimental Economics in Bonn. Additionally CII was played 1 time with 36, 
54, 72 and 90 students. Subjects are told that in each period they have to make a choice 
between A and B. The subjects of CII set-up did not know the payoff function. They were 
told that if there A and B is choosen by the same number of people, subjects who had choosen  
A get a better payoff than subjects who had choosen B. At the end of an experiment each 
patricians was played an amount in Euro proportional to his cumulated payoff sum he had 
reached over the 100 periods.     
 
The experimental data statistics is listed and compared with simulation results in chapter 4.   
 
 
2.   Reinforcement Learning  
 
2.1.   Reinforcement Algorithm with Pure Strategies  
 
The reinforcement algorithm with pure strategies already described by Harley (1981) and later 
by Arthur (1991) has been used extensively by Erew and Roth (1995) in the experimental 
economics literature.  Figure 1 explains the original reinforcement algorithm. 
 
We are looking at player i who has to choose among n pure strategies 1,…,n over a number of 
periods t, t=1..T. The probabilities of “strategy x is chosen by player i” is proportional to its   4
“propensity” 
t
x , i q . In period 1 these propensities are exogenously determined parameters. 
Whenever the strategy x is used in period t, the resulting payoff 
t
x a  is added to the propensity 
if this payoff is positive. If all payoffs are positive, then the propensity is the sum of all 
previous payoffs for this strategy plus its initial propensity. Therefore one can think of a 
propensity as a payoff sum.  
 
Initialisation: For each player i let  ] q ,..., q [ n , i , i
1 1
1  the initial propensity, where n is the number of  
                       strategies, which are used in the simulations. 













t+1. period:   For each player i, let 
t
i a  the payoff of player i in period t,  
 x the number of the chosen strategy in period t.  
CASE I::  0 ≥
t
i a :                                         CASE II  0 <
t
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Figure 1 : The Reinforcement Algorithm 
 
2.2.   The Empirical Foundation for an Extended Reinforcement Model 
 
The only pure strategies in CI and CII are “place A” and “place B”. This strategies do not 
represent a players belief about the other participants behaviour. In our extended model we 
add two further strategies which include the consideration of players about the others based 
on last periods payoff.   
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Direct: A participant who had a good (bad) payoff may stay on the last periods place (change 
his last choice). We call this direct response mode. A change is the more probable the worse 
the payoff was. The direct response mode is the prevailing one but there is also a contrarian 
response mode.  
 
Contrarian: Under the contrarian response mode a change of the last choice is more likely 
the better the payoff was. The contrarian participant expects that a high payoff will attract 
many others in the next period.  
In CI a “bad” payoff could obviously defined by 0 a “good” payoff by 1. In CII with 
18λ ,λ =1,…,5 players the pure equilibrium payoff is ε =10λ . Payoffs perceived as “bad” 
tend to be below ε  and payoffs perceived as “good”  tend to be above ε . Accordingly we 
classified the strategie of a subject as direct if there is a change (stay) after a payoff smaller 
(greater) than 10. The opposite strategy is classified as contrarian.  
 
 
2.3   Measuring Direct and Contrarian Strategies 
 
For each subject let c- (c+) be the number of times in which a subject changes from A to B or 
from B to A when there was bad (good) payoff in the period before. And for each subject let 
s- (s+) be the number of times in which a subject stays on the same place when there was bad 
(good) payoff in the period before. 
For each subject in the experiments CI and CII a Yule coefficient Q has been computed as 
follows: 
 
− + + −




s c s c
s c s c
Q  ,   0 ≠ ⋅ + ⋅ − + + − s c s c . 
  
The Yule coefficient has a range from –1 to +1. In the rare cases subject never (in each 
period) changes his last choise, we defined Q = 0 because the decision of such a subject   6
depends not on the last period payoff. Subject with Yule coefficients below –.5 could be 
understand as classified as direct and subjects above +.5 as contrarian.   
 
 
2.4.    Extended Reinforcement Learning 
 
In our simulations of CI 9 Agents respectively of CII 18,46, 54, 72, 90 Agents interact for 100 
periods just like in our experiments described in section 3. In CI and CII each player has two 
pure strategies: 
 
Place A:    This strategy consists in taking A. 
Place B:    This strategy consists in taking B. 
After the first period in each of the two games (CI) and (CII) the two 
extended strategies direct and contrarian are available additionaly:  
 
(CI) direct:  The payoff of a player is 1, then the player stays on the same place last 
chosen. If his payoff is 0 the players changes (from A to B or from B to 
A). 
 
(CI) contrarian:  The payoff of a player is 1, then the player changes (from A to B or 
from B to A). If his payoff is 0 the players will stay on the same place.  
 
(CII) direct:  This strategy corresponds to the direct response mode. The payoff of a 
player is compared to his median payoff among his payoffs for all 
periods up to now. If the present payoff is lower then this median 
payoff, then the place is changed. If the payoff is greater than this 
median payoff, the player stays on the same place as before. It may also 
happen that the current payoff is equal to the median payoff. In this 
case, the place is changed if the number of previous payoffs above the 
median is greater than the number of previous payoffs below the   7
median. In the opposite case, the place is not changed. In the rare cases 
where both numbers are equal, the place is changed with probability ½. 
 
 
(CII) contrarian:  A player who takes this strategy stays on the last chosen place if his 
current payoff is smaller then the median payoff among the payoffs for 
all previous periods and he changes the place in the opposite case. If the 
current payoff is equal to this median payoff, then he changes the place 
if the number of previous payoff below the median payoff is greater 
then the number above the median payoff. If the numbers of previous 
payoff below and above the median payoff are equal, the place is 
changed with probability ½. 
 
 
2.4. Initial Propensity 
 
The difficulty arises that the initial propensities must be estimated from the empirical data. 
For each game CI and CII we did this by varying the initial propensities for the strategies 
place A and place B over all integer values from 1 to 10 and the initial propensities for the 
strategies direct and contrarian over all integer values from 0 to 10. 
 
For each initial propensity we tested 1000 Simulations. To show the general behaviour of the 
simulations in Figure: 3-5 one could see several selected statistical parameters depending on 
the initial propensities listed in figure 2. The numbers refer to the strategies place A, place B, 
direct and contrarian in this order. 
 
{} 120 1 : ] 0 , 0 , , [ : 0 ≤ ≤ = q q q I ,   {} 120 1 : ] 0 , , , [ : 1 ≤ ≤ = q q q q I , { } 120 1 : ] , , , [ 2 ≤ ≤ = q q q q q I  
{} 120 1 : ] , 0 , , [ : 3 ≤ ≤ = q q q q I ,  {} 120 1 : ] , , 0 , 0 [ : 4 ≤ ≤ = q q q I  
 
Figure 2: Initial Propensities. 
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One could see in figure 3 that for each simulation run and each initial propensity the mean 
number of agents on place A is close to 4.5. The convergence to the theoretical mixed 
equilibrium was already observed in the simulation data of Roth & Erev. 
 










































Figure 3: Players on A. 
 
The standard deviation of number of players on place A per period (figure 4) is correlated to 
the number of changes (figure 5) per periods. It got the highest values with propensities from 
the set  1 I . In this cases the strategy direct is present and contrarian is absent. The strategy 
direct forces changes after a the bad payoff 0 which is the most frequent in the majority game.       
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Figure 4: Standard Deviation of Number of Players on Place A 
 




































Figure 5: Number of Road Changes per Period. 
 
 
Players with high Yule-coefficients in the experiments are assigned to the direct type, this 
appears also in the figure 6. For the initial propensities, in which no contrarian change 
behaviour is implemented for example (1110) step high Yule-coefficients up. For the initial   10
propensities, in which the contrarian behaviour is favoured for example (1101) all values the 











































Figure 6: Mean Yule-coefficients. 
 
 
Similar results could get by investigations of the initial propensities for simulations of CII.  
 
 
4. Experimental Statistics and Simulation Results 
 
4.1. CI with 9 Players  
 
For each propensity vector 
2 2
4 1 } 10 ,..., 0 { } 10 ,..., 1 { ] ,..., [ × ∈ q q  we run 1000 simulations 
according to the experiments with 100 periods. The numbers of the propensity vector refer to 
the strategies place A, place B, direct and contrarian in this order. We compared the mean 
values of each of the 1000 simulations of 6 statistical variables which are listed in table 3 with 
minimum and maximum values of the experimental data.   
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There were three parameter combinations which satisfied the requirement of yielding means 
for the six variables between the minimal and maximal experimentally observed values. This 




Simulations  Experiment 
CI  Minimum  {1,1,2,1} {2,2,1,1} {3,3,4,2} Maximum 
Player on A [mean]  4,19  4.48 4.50 4.54  4.74 
Player on A [standard deviation]  0.67  1.45 1.48 1.50  1.50 
Changes [mean]  0.59  4.32 4.18 4.51  5.17 
Period of last Change  54.44  96.11 97.67 97.44  98.11 
Yule Q [mean]  -0.01  0.10 0.04 0.14  0.87 
Yule Q [standard deviation]  0.33  0.50 0.40 0.35  0.76 
 
Table 2: CI – 9 Players - Experimental Minima & Maxima vs. Simulation Means. 
 
The parameter combinations seem to be reasonable vectors of initial propensities. There is no 
difference between place A and place B, so it is reasonable to have the same propensities for 
both places. In two of the three vectors the propensity of the direct mode is greater than the 
others propensities. It is remarkable that no initial propensities which contains only pure 
strategies does fit the experimental data.  
 
 
4.2.2.  CII with 18 Players 
 
In set-up CII with 18 player we got only one parameter combination from the set 
{} {}
2 2 10 0 10 1 ,..., ,..., ×  which satisfied the requirement of yielding means for the six variables 
between the minimal and maximal experimentally observed values. This was the parameter 
combination (4,3,3,2). In table 3 compared the mean values of each of the 1000 simulations of 
6 statistical variables which are listed in table 3 with minimum and maximum values of the 
experimental data.   
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Experiment SimulationsExperiment 
CII  Minimum  {4,3,3,2}  Minimum 
Player on B [mean]  5,85  5,95  6,17 
Player on B [standard deviation] 1,59  1,65  1,99 
Changes [mean]  4,62  5,17  5,38 
Period of last Change  64,78  83,73  90,39 
Yule Q [mean]  0,11  0,14  0,39 
Yule Q [standard deviation]  0,53  0,61  0,75 
 
Table 3: CII – 18 Players - Experimental Minima & Maxima vs. Simulation Means. 
 
In the beginning of the game the players know that the capacity of A is greater than B. It 
seems to be reasonable to suppose that at least in the beginning the pure strategies A and B 
have a greater propensity sum than direct and contrarian. Like in CI no initial propensitie 
which contains only pure strategies fits the experimental data. 
 
4.2.3.  Simulations of CII with 18, 36, 54, 72, and 90 Players 
 
Finally we compared the mean of six statistical variables of  1000 simulations with 18, 36, 54, 
72, and 90 players with experiments of the same number of players. For simulations with  λ 18  
players we used the initial propensities  ( ) 2 3 3 4 , , , ⋅ λ , λ =2,…,5.  The vector (4,3,3,2) has been 
determined in section 4.2.2.    
Statistical Data CII  Data 
Sorce 
Number of Players  
      18 36  54  72  90 
E  5,98  12,21  17,98  24,2  30,02 
Mean (# players on B) 
S  5,95  11,91  17,9  23,83  29,02 
E  1,78  2,64 3,24 4,54 5,02 
st. Dev. (# players on B) 
S  1,65  2,39 3,04 3,78 4,58 
E  4,82  11,35  15,57  22,76  26,02 
Mean (# of place changes) 
S  5,17  10,07  15,98  21,32  23,04 
E  81  82 86 89 88 
Mean (last place change 
S  84  89 84 88 90 
E  0,28  0,14  0,22  0,2  0,24 
Mean (Yule-coefficient) 
S  0,14  0,16  0,15  0,15  0,16 
E  0,58  0,58 0,58 0,57 0,6 
st. Dev. (Yule-coefficient) 
S  0,61  0,54 0,54 0,52 0,56 
 
Table 5: CII –Experimental Means (E) vs. Simulation Means (S).   13
5. Conclusion 
 
We have run simulations based on a payoff sum reinforcement model. We applied this model 
on two similar experimental set ups CI and CII. Simulated mean values of six variables have 
been compared with the experimentally observed minimal and maximal of these variables. 
The simulated means were always in this range. Only four parameters of the simulation 
model, the initial propensities, were estimated from the data. In view of the simplicity of the 
model it is surprising that one obtains a quite close fit to the experimental data. With a linear 
transformation of the initial propensity the simulations fit experiments results with a higher 
number of players.  
 
Two response modes can be found in the experimental data, a direct one in which changes 
follow bad payoffs and a contrarian one in which changes follow good payoffs. One can 
understand these response modes as due to different views of the causal structure of the 
situation. If one expects that A is crowded in period t A is likely to be crowded in period t+1 
one will be in the direct response mode but if one thinks that many people will change in the 
next periode because it was crowded today one has reason to be in the contrarian response 
mode.  
  
The strategies direct and contrarian are necessary to be represented in the simulations for 
fitting the experimental data. They appear in the simulations as the result of an endogenous 
learning behaviour by which initially homogeneous subjects become differentiated over time. 
 
It is surprising that a very straightforward reinforcement model reproduces the experimental 
data as well as shown by table 5. Even the mean Yule coefficient is in the experimentally 
observed range. In spite of the fact that at the beginning of the simulation the behaviour of all 
simulated players is exactly the same. It is not assumed that there are different types of 
players.  
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6. Appendix 
Figures 9-14 illustrate the experimental means in comparison to the simulated means of table 
5. Black boxes represent the simulated values and the white boxes the empirical data. 
 
  































Figure 9: Mean Number of Players on S in Experiments and Simulations. 
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Figure 10: Standard Deviation number of Players on S in Experiments and Simulations. 
 























Figure 11: Number of Changes in Experiments and Simulations. 
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Figure 12: Last change in experiments and simulations. 
 





























Figure 13: Mean yule-coefficients in experiments and simulations. 
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